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Cyprus and its Accession
to the European Union
The issue of accession is one of the most important foreign policy issues
for us, because, similarly with the other candidates from Central and
Eastern Europe, Cyprus aspires to find its proper role in Europe and to
secure a better future for its people within the framework of the European
Union.
The success of Cyprus’ quest for full integration in the EU will be a his-
toric development which will allow our small country to realise its full
potential in the ever-evolving European construction, on the threshold of
the third millennium.
I have chosen as a starting point to emphasise the future. It certainly looks
promising for Cyprus, as a prospective member state of the Union.
But how is this common future being shaped on the Continent itself ?
As a uniquely successful venture in the history of mankind, the European
Union finds itself at a very important crossroad, necessitating new ap-
proaches both in terms of its institutional structures and the ambit of its
policies. At the same time, it has already embarked on its fifth enlarge-
ment, opening its doors to European countries who share the same ideals,
political principles and aspirations with the fifteen member states.
The Union seeks to assert its own stake in the future of the European
Continent, aiming, also through economic and monetary union, at creat-
ing those conditions which will guarantee a stable and secure environmentIoannis Kasoulides
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that will nurture cohesive and sustainable development and political and
social progress.
This integrative and integrating drive has ever more new dimensions and
implications for candidate and partner countries as well. The inclusion of
Justice and Home Affairs issues into the Community competencies, under
the Treaty of Amsterdam, coupled with the goals of the European Con-
ference and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are concrete indications
of the desire to institutionalise and strengthen both supranational and in-
tergovernmental co-operation in an ever-expanding area, which at the pre-
sent stage embraces both the central and eastern parts of the European
Continent and the entire Mediterranean basin.
As one of six candidate countries which began negotiations for accession
in March 1998, Cyprus faces on the one hand the challenge of complying
fully with the demands of the acquis communautaire, while at the same
time it braces itself for a pivotal role in the Union’s plans in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
I propose therefore to dwell on three particular themes:
First: Why should Cyprus accede to the Union?
Second: What are the potential benefits from Cyprus’ accession in the po-
litical and economic fields?
Third: How we propose to proceed, bearing in mind both the constraints
of the present situation and the existing opportunities.
A great part of the reasoning for seeking accession to the Communities is
evidently common from previous enlargements as in becoming a part of a
broader, politically stable and responsive group of countries, who have
managed through the Institutions and the policies of the Communities to
create a very dynamic presence on the global stage and are slowly but
steadily asserting their unique collective political identity.
In what is now the Union there is strong emphasis on the social dimen-
sions of the European construction, including the Social Charter, the con-Cyprus and its Accession to the European Union
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cept of European Citizenship, education, employment and environmental
protection. Equally if not more important are the strong emphasis on the
rule of law and respect for human rights that the Union places in its rela-
tions to third countries.
It is naturally very difficult to be on the periphery of this dynamic group-
ing of states and to resist the strong attractions of membership. For Cy-
prus in particular, the application for membership stems historically and
culturally from its being at the very fount of European civilisation for
over 3000 years. It is a natural progression of its long association and
trade relations with the European Communities and the pragmatic needs
of a small, open and dynamic economy in an era of globalisation and
complex interdependence. Yet, as I will explain in more detail later, the
supreme considerations for seeking accession are of a political nature.
I will now turn to my second theme, namely the arguments in favour of
Cyprus’ accession. We believe that such a development would positively
contribute to achieving both the specific and broader objectives of the
Union: Extending enlargement to the Mediterranean is not simply a bal-
ancing move vis à vis enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. It is a
necessity dictated by the policy options already decided on and applied by
the Union, aiming at consolidating peace and stability, by extending the
policy frontiers far beyond the current physical borders of the Union.
Like the other candidates for accession, Cyprus aspires to find its proper
role and place in this overarching European enterprise, which has both
political and geostrategic dimensions. The geographic location of Cyprus
at the cross-roads of three continents presents numerous opportunities for
what the Union wants to achieve in the Eastern Mediterranean region and
beyond.
As a prospective EU member-state, Cyprus has every potential to become
an economic, political and cultural gateway to the Middle East, an area
presenting various challenges in terms of peace and stability, also very
vital for the Union, in terms of trade flows and energy supplies.Ioannis Kasoulides
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In this potential role, Cyprus presents a very attractive prospect if its pre-
sent capabilities and advantages are considered: Apart from free market
economy, liberal democratic status, and its secure legal environment, Cy-
prus has excellent relations with its neighbours, with the Arab countries
and Israel, making it a reliable partner for all types of activities through-
out the region. In the same way as our business partners from Europe,
our neighbours find in Cyprus the proper environment for business and
other activities, exploiting modern infrastructure and facilities in terms of
travel, maritime and air transport and telecommunications.
Firmly believing in the building of bridges of co-operation and under-
standing between Europe and the Mediterranean basin, we have invested
great faith and efforts in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. For, in its
three main chapters, namely security and stability, economic and indus-
trial co-operation and cultural and human affairs, we have all the more
reasons to share the Union’s vision of a truly stable and peaceful Mediter-
ranean region, more especially so, in its eastern part and the Middle East.
For Cyprus, accession would mean its becoming a steady anchor for what
the Union wishes to achieve. It would also mean the natural culmination
of a long-standing relationship, extending institutionally, back to 1972,
with the signing of our Association Agreement with the then European
Community.
A synopsis of the evolution of our bilateral relations ever since points to
continuous important developments such as the Customs Union Protocol
of 1987, the application for membership in July 1990 and the favourable
response in June 1993, as well as the Council decisions to involve Cyprus
in the next round of enlargement, the opening of enlargement negotiations
in March 1998 and the decision of 5 October to commence substantive
accession negotiations on 10th November 1998. This latest development
brings me to the issue of negotiations and the preparedness of Cyprus to
face the challenges that lie ahead.
In the economic and technical field, the progress achieved through the
substantive discussions of 1994 and the ensuing structured dialogue hasCyprus and its Accession to the European Union
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been remarkable. The task of harmonisation has become an important part
of the workload of government and legislative machinery and new con-
cepts and "Euro-speak" have become everyday parlance and favourite
terms in the mass media: In the perceptions of the people the prefix
"Euro-" has acquired the qualities of incontestable guarantees and every-
thing with a Union connection is treated with greatest seriousness in po-
litical discourse. This is but a by product and a reflection of the serious
work that has been done and will be intensified at all levels in order to
adopt and apply the acquis communautaire with as few special arrange-
ments as may be necessary and of the shortest possible duration.
Despite the potential losses and costs, such as those emanating from the
adoption of the Common Customs Tariff, our basic aim is to create a
strong and competitive economy, able to withstand the impact from trade
liberalisation under the GATT Agreement and from full participation in
the Union’s Single Market.
Economically, Cyprus finds itself in a stage of transition, trying to move
away from high production costs and low productivity to new structures
and methods which would guarantee efficiency and productivity as the
prerequisites of competitiveness, and as the solid bases for a policy aimed
at economic and social cohesion throughout Cyprus.
The prospects for the economy look promising, especially considering
that Cyprus is emerging as an important centre in the maritime sector and
in transit trade. Our policy is to maintain and further promote Cyprus as
an international services and business centre, exploiting the comparative
advantages of a very sophisticated work pool, the sound business and le-
gal environment, the closeness to the countries of the region and the fa-
cilities and connections which will encourage the inflow of investments.
Naturally, as with all international business centres, Cyprus faces the
challenge of countering organised crime and especially such phenomena
as money laundering. To this end, we are in very close contact and co-
operation with various international institutions, the European Commis-
sion, the member states of the EU, the United States and the Council ofIoannis Kasoulides
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Europe, aiming to improve even more our satisfactory record and reputa-
tion.
The positive results of our efforts in this regard are also reflected in the
reports of the World Bank’s Financial Action Task Force, in the 1997 and
1998 International Narcotics Strategy Control Report by the U.S. De-
partment of State and in the June 1998 "First Mutual Evaluation Report",
by the Select Committee of Experts of the Council of Europe.
Summing up, I would say that Cyprus’ accession course is underpinned
by its European identity and culture, the smooth functioning of its demo-
cratic institutions, the good performance of its economy, the excellent
climate for business and its friendly relations with the countries of the re-
gion that would justify its potential role as another, very solid bridge be-
tween them and the European Union.
Turning now to the potential benefits expected from accession, I would
like to stress once more that the overall process is subsumed under our
supreme strategic objective, namely to end the division of our country.
The as yet unresolved political problem of Cyprus has to a great extent
dictated the positions and political aims of both Cyprus and the Union
within the context of their relations. Both wish to see a negotiated settle-
ment to the Cyprus problem and that accession shall be of benefit to the
people of Cyprus as a whole, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike
and contribute to civil peace and reconciliation.
Towards this vital end, my Government perceives the course of accession
to the EU as a very important additional dynamic that could act as a
catalyst towards the solution of the Cyprus problem. It remains our firm
belief that the realisation of this potential catalyst role presupposes that
the course of accession of Cyprus must remain free of any political pre-
conditions or restrictions and proceed unhindered.
Our desire and all our efforts are indeed geared towards a political solu-
tion, preferably before the time of accession. President Clerides has re-
peatedly tried through direct appeal and through the Secretary-General ofCyprus and its Accession to the European Union
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the United Nations to start or restart the process of dialogue on the politi-
cal problem of Cyprus. He has called on the Turkish Cypriot Community
and on the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, to work together in
building a common future in our common homeland, learning from the
lessons of the past.
In our quest for new avenues towards a better, secure future for Cyprus,
we are proceeding on the first lesson from the history of European inte-
gration, that co-operation towards a common vision is by far preferable to
confrontation and division. We therefore consider accession to the EU as
an extremely propitious opportunity for Cyprus and its people, Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, for a common and truly secure fu-
ture together.
That is indeed why, despite the fact that the occupied part of Cyprus re-
mains one of the most densely militarised parts of the world, and I am
quoting here the S-G of the UN, a decision was made not to deploy the S-
300 missile system.
It was a conscious choice made by responsible and moderate political
leadership, despite its justified fears and security concerns. It was the
choice of a reliable and credible future partner of the Union.
We decided, once on track towards EU accession to be unequivocal as to
our goals and commitments. With the few means available to us, Cyprus
wishes to contribute to the stability that is vital for our very sensitive re-
gion, while at the same time contributing towards the overall political
goals of the Union, as also expressed through its Common Foreign and
Security Policy. In this respect, we are facilitating the Union’s policy and
strategy for solving the problems of the area. Thus, Cyprus can no longer
be considered as a negative factor but as a contributor to the Union’s
overarching policy in the region.
The most important elements of this policy lie in the conclusions of the
European Councils at Luxembourg and Cardiff: For Cyprus, it opened the
way for accession negotiations and expressed the wish for Turkish Cyp-Ioannis Kasoulides
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riot participation. For Greece, the road of Turkey’s closer relations to the
EU is made conditional also to Turkey’s co-operation in resolving the is-
sues of the Aegean and Cyprus.
For Turkey, a comprehensive strategy was elaborated and debated in ad-
ditional proposals from the Commission. It appears that this balanced ap-
proach, if accepted by all three countries, would have assured a cohesive
C.F.S.P. for south-eastern Europe. In our view, the country mainly re-
sponsible for blocking the efforts of the Union for this equitable and bal-
anced approach is Turkey itself. Instead of responding positively to the
Union’s generous offer, Turkey has hardened its policies towards Cyprus
and the Aegean, does not allow the Turkish Cypriots to accept the offer to
participate in the accession negotiations, refuses to discuss its record on
human rights, and it seems that all it is interested in is only the financial
aspects of its relations with the EU.
It can therefore be asked: Where do the interests of the Union lie? In
taking Cyprus in as a member or in keeping Cyprus out of its integration
process?
We are not tired of repeating and emphasising that all our initiatives and
actions are guided by our earnest desire to find a comprehensive and
functional solution to the political problem of Cyprus, as early as possible
and without any further delay.
We believe that all the elements for a just and lasting solution are on the
table, namely the provisions for a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, with
a large degree of autonomy for the Turkish Cypriot Community and with
guaranteed respect for its linguistic, religious and cultural identity.
Parallel to that, there is a vision to be shared by all Cypriots within
Europe, whose political, economic and social context will be beneficial to
both Communities in Cyprus, addressing their fears and concerns and of-
fering opportunities for stability and prosperity for all Cypriots.
There are of course those who are questioning whether it is possible to
proceed, given Mr. Denktash’s refusal to agree even to the launching ofCyprus and its Accession to the European Union
11
the application for membership, his insistence on recognition of the illegal
by-product of the Turkish invasion as a separate state and the rejection of
the invitation of President Clerides to nominate representatives from the
Turkish Cypriot Community as full members of the team negotiating the
terms of Cyprus’ accession to the European Union.
If Turkey were allowed to achieve both its goals, namely the non-solution
of the Cyprus problem and the non-accession of Cyprus in the Union, that
would mean, inter alia, that it will feel entitled to seek from the Union
satisfaction of its own demands, without a reciprocal obligation to re-
spond to criteria applicable to all candidate countries.
Furthermore, this would also result in aggravation of the existing prob-
lems in the cohesion of the C.F.S.P. as Turkey, feeling permitted to act
without constraints, would undoubtedly exacerbate further the tension in
its relations with Greece and the present situation within Cyprus itself.
So, how do we propose to proceed, given both the constraints and the op-
portunities that are there?
It is a paradox, but it is true that the positive elements with which we
have to work are related to what Mr. Denktash has so far actually not
said. To the best of my knowledge, the T/C Community is not opposed to
the idea of accession of Cyprus to the EU. What is even more heartening
is the result of a poll that has indicated overwhelming support among the
Turkish Cypriot Community for accession to the EU, at a very high level
of 94.5%. Though qualified by a wish or desire to see Turkey acceding at
the same time as Cyprus and for a prior solution to the political problem,
this and other expressions of opinion of the Turkish Cypriots provide
room for hope.
Firstly, it is up to the EU to decide when Turkey shall become a member.
The Turkish Cypriots could definitely play a role here within a reunified
Cyprus.
Second, and most importantly, we agree entirely with our Turkish Cyp-
riot compatriots in their desire for a political solution before accession.Ioannis Kasoulides
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This is indeed what all our efforts are aimed at. The challenge before us
is to start talking and proceeding in a spirit of constructive co-operation
with a view to a solution before accession.
That is why we propose to engage the two Communities of Cyprus in two
parallel processes, respectively aiming at a lasting solution of the political
problem under UN auspices and at the full involvement and positive con-
tribution of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the accession negotiations
process. All our political energies are devoted towards the hope that these
two processes can converge in substance and in time, if possible, before
accession.
We earnestly believe that it is possible to convert the desire for EU acces-
sion to positive political will of the Turkish Cypriot Community. Within
our means, we have tried and shall spare no efforts in persuading our
compatriots that the absurdity of the present cease-fire line dividing Cy-
prus is an anachronism and an affront to human dignity and to common
sense, taking into consideration the size of our country both in terms of
territory and population, the developments which take place in the Euro-
pean integration process and the common destiny of the Cypriot commu-
nities to live together in peace and harmony in their own homeland.
It must not escape the attention of any neutral observer that the Turkish
Cypriot Community is also suffering from the illegal occupation of 37%
of our country by Turkey. If they were indeed content with their present
lot, how can one explain the emigration of over 50,000 Turkish Cypriots
from the occupied area since 1975 ?
We have now reached a point where the estimated 88,000 Turkish Cypri-
ots have become a minority in the area under occupation, considerably
outnumbered by an estimated 110,000 illegal settlers from mainland Tur-
key.
For the present, and until the Turkish Cypriot leadership decides to sit
around the table, all we can do in our discussions with the European Un-Cyprus and its Accession to the European Union
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ion is proceed on the basis of what would be the best scenario for Cyprus
and in the interest of all Cypriots.
At the same time, I wish to bring to your attention the proposal by Presi-
dent Clerides, aimed at the demilitarisation of Cyprus, with provision of
security by an international force comprised of contingents from Euro-
pean countries, NATO countries and others, operating under mandate of
the UN Security Council. Such an arrangement combined with a member-
ship of Cyprus in the E.U. would radically change the present security
situation and would bring about an increased sense of security for both
communities which in its turn would create the conditions for civil peace
and reconciliation on the island.
So far, Turkey’s positions with regard to Cyprus’ accession vary from a
rejection of the internationally established position on the legality of the
application for membership to an inextricable linkage with its own acces-
sion to the EU, both positions being equally untenable. The European
Council has repeatedly called on Turkey to contribute to a political solu-
tion in Cyprus, while emphasising at the same time that Turkey’s actions
and policies in Cyprus are one of the reasons why it cannot be accepted in
the growing family of nations making up the European Union.
Based on its own logic and calculations, Turkey feels that it can gain by
holding Cyprus hostage to its own strategic designs, despite the fact that a
demilitarised Cyprus would not pose any kind of threat to Turkey’s secu-
rity. On the contrary, a solution to the Question of Cyprus would elimi-
nate one of the key obstacles to Turkey’s recognised vocation to be a fu-
ture EU member.
With Turkey being its nearest neighbour, Cyprus has every interest in
seeing that country develop economically and socially in a manner where
internal peace can be translated into good neighbourly relations, in con-
formity with internationally accepted standards of behaviour.
Until this goal is realised, Cyprus cannot remain hostage of the Turkish
intransigence and its accession to the Union cannot be subjected to aIoannis Kasoulides
14
Turkish veto, if there is no solution of the political problem at the time of
the completion of the accession negotiations. We are convinced that the
European Union’s most effective contribution in the efforts to solve the
Question of Cyprus will be the unhindered continuation and successful
conclusion of the accession negotiations even if the political problem is
not solved.
A persistent and coherent policy of the Union on the accession of Cyprus,
preferable with but also even without a solution, is absolutely necessary if
we are to overcome the constraints and the difficulties presented by Tur-
key’s refusal to cooperate for a peaceful political settlement.
Indeed, such a firm and unequivocal message cannot but benefit Turkey
itself as well, by encouraging and fostering a more forthcoming attitude
towards the very positive options and possibilities that lie for Turkey itself
in the prospect of a reunified, federal Cyprus in the EU.
For the Union itself, it has been very properly stated that it wishes to see
accession of the whole of Cyprus and for the benefit of both Communi-
ties. That is indeed identical to our position, for the application concerns
the whole of Cyprus and all Cypriots, whether Turkish, Greek, Maronite,
Armenian or Latin.
What remains is to accept in no uncertain fashion that Cyprus cannot on
its own means ensure that the acquis will apply throughout its sovereign
territory, with part of it still under illegal military occupation. A firm
policy of the Union that would thus help Turkey extricate itself from the
imbroglio it has created in Cyprus and would be a significant success for
the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. It would also add a
great deal of credibility to the Union’s expressed determination to con-
tribute to peace and stability in the Mediterranean region.
The Question of Cyprus is not just another international problem, it is
primarily a European problem, having in mind that Cyprus is a European
country and given that two member states (the United Kingdom and
Greece) are involved as guarantors of Cyprus’ independence together withCyprus and its Accession to the European Union
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Turkey which has a Customs Union with the Union and aspires also to
join it as a full member.
This is beside the fact that Cyprus itself is negotiating the terms of its ac-
cession to the Union. The argument, therefore, that the EU does not want
a divided country to join in order to avoid importing the Cyprus Problem
is a fallacy. For, in many of the Union’s policies and actions, for example
its strategy vis à vis Turkey, the problem of Cyprus and the Greco-
Turkish dispute are already on the agenda and affect their outcome and
their success.
The political problem, therefore, and Cyprus’ accession go at the heart of
credibility of avowed principles and ideals and present a paradigm test
case for modern international relations, as well as a pointer to the future.ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-933307-47-3
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